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Abstract
This paper addresses the question under which circumstances unemployment can be lower if unions
bargain over wages and employment in a general equilibrium framework. Thereby, it turns out that the
unemployment rate may negatively depend on the wage rate, if the unemployment compensation
scheme contains a constant real term in addition to the replacement ratio component. This is, compared
with a pure replacement ratio scheme, the more plausible formalization of the real world's compensation
systems, at least for European countries. Besides the theoretical analysis, the paper also derives political
implications by identifying the relevant parameters for the decision on whether weakening unions will
be a good strategy for an economy to overcome its unemployment problem.
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1 Introduction
Contrary to the United States where unemployment rates declined for the
last 15 years and are now at a very low level, high unemployment rates are
one of the main problems for most European economies. Due to this, there
seems to be broad consensus in European countries that the …ght against
unemployment has to be given high priority by economic policy. However,
there is substantial disagreement how this can be achieved, although many
economists and politicians consider institutional di¤erences between the USA
and Europe as a major source of European unemployment problems. Four
institutional factors are commonly identi…ed as possible reasons for the high
European unemployment rates: (i) social security systems, which provide a
safety net for the living standards of those out of work, (ii) minimum wages,
(iii) employment protection legislation and (iv) trade unions. [compare Gregg
and Manning (1997)]
In general, economists and politicians do agree that trade unions worsen
the unemployment problem and that therefore unions should be weakened.
Since unions are of higher importance in European labour markets (the U.S.
labour market seems to be hardly distorted by unions) it may be this dif-
ference which explains high European unemployment rates in comparison to
the U.S. The British example, where the unemployment rate declined in the
period of 1986 to 1998 after government legislation reduced the power of
unions, supports the conclusion that weakening unions could moderate the
European unemployment problem. Recently, some economists argued that
centralised bargaining becomes less e¢cient because it is not ‡exible enough.
They propose to replace centralised bargaining procedures by more decen-
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tralised arrangements [compare for example Snower (1999)]. This would
mean a weakening of trade unions in the bargaining process with …rms and
can therefore be seen as a further proposal for a reduction of unions’ bar-
gaining power.
To understand why many economists and politicians come to the conclu-
sion that wage bargaining causes unemployment, it is necessary to look at
the theoretical models used in the trade union literature. Two frameworks
are common to analyse the impact of trade unions on unemployment and
wage rates. Following a well established tradition, they are called
² right-to-manage (including monopoly union models as special case) and
² e¢cient bargaining.
The two frameworks di¤er in considering di¤erent bargaining sets, i.e.
they di¤er in describing di¤erent sets of possible agreements. Whereas in
right-to-manage models …rms and unions bargain over wages and …rms set
employment afterwards, e¢cient bargaining allows …rms and unions to bar-
gain over both, wages and employment. If …rms have the right to choose
employment, the equilibrium will always lie on the marginal-return-to-labour
curve. Thus, there is always a positive relationship between the unemploy-
ment rate and the wage rate. In contrast, under e¢cient bargaining the
outcome lies on a contract curve which is di¤erent from the marginal-return-
to-labour curve. Possibly, this contract curve is positively sloped, which im-
plies a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage
rate. Such an unemployment decreasing e¤ect of e¢cient bargaining has been
analysed by McDonald and Solow (1981) in a partial equilibrium framework.
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Till the beginning of the 1990s there has been an extensive discussion about
the plausibility of an unemployment decreasing bargaining solution between
one trade union and one …rm. Empirical evidence and theoretical arguments
for and against a positively sloped contract curve were brought into this
debate.1
Although the empirical evidence was ambiguous, Layard and Nickell (1990)
rejected the possibility of an unemployment decreasing e¤ect of e¢cient bar-
gaining from a theoretical point of view. Their main innovation was to use
a general equilibrium framework instead of the partial equilibrium one inves-
tigated by McDonald and Solow (1981). The term general equilibrium used
in this way may be confusing. In the trade union literature the terms partial
and general equilibrium are used to distinguish between models where only
one …rm and one union are investigated [e.g. McDonald and Solow (1981)]
and models where bargains of all …rms and unions are analysed [e.g. Layard
and Nickell (1990)]. Under their assumptions, Layard and Nickell (1990)
concluded that contrary to the partial equilibrium result, in a general equi-
librium framework “(...) in all cases the wage rate will move in the same
direction as the unemployment rate (...)” (p. 786-7).2 This means that
if general equilibrium e¤ects are taken into account the existence of trade
unions raises both wages and the unemployment rate (independent of the
bargaining set), which supports the common view that weakening unions
1Compare for example Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Card (1986), MaCurdy and
Pencavell (1986), Oswald (1992) and Aronsson et al. (1993) for empirical evidence in
di¤erent countries. Lever and van Veen (1991) give a good overview.
2Since a vertical labour supply curve is considered, employment rising and unemploy-
ment decreasing e¤ects are used synonymously.
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helps to cure unemployment problems.
This paper questions the robustness of the standard result that in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework e¢cient bargaining may never decrease the unem-
ployment rate. Based on Layard and Nickell (1990), who assume a constant
replacement ratio, the possible unemployment e¤ects of e¢cient bargaining
under variants of social compensation systems are analysed in this paper.
Two polar cases are taken into account. The …rst one consists of ‡at-rate
bene…ts and the second one of bene…ts that are a constant fraction of wage
payments. Following a well established tradition, they are called Beveridgian
and Bismarckian. Finally combinations of these polar cases, which allow for
a replacement ratio term and, in addition, for a constant real term, are in-
vestigated. The latter may be associated with social assistance payments,
which (at least) may become relevant for long-term unemployed. This type
of unemployment comensation scheme seems to be a plausible formalization
for European countries (Italy, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Spain, etc.)3
The main …nding in this paper is that the possible unemployment decreas-
ing e¤ect of e¢cient bargaining identi…ed by McDonald and Solow (1981) in
a partial equilibrium framework is preserved in the general equilibrium if the
3OECD (1991) gives a good overview of di¤erent unemployment compensation schemes.
But the data material presented there does only incorporate payments for the unemployed,
so that Germany and Austria seem not to guarantee social assistance payments indepen-
dent of wage payments. If, contrary, social assistance payments which are independent of
whether someone was employed previously or not and which therefore guarantee a mini-
mum income for all inhabitants are considered (in Austria and Germany such payments
are called ”Notstandshilfe” and ”Sozialhilfe”, respecitvely), the compensation scheme in-
troduced here is also an appropriate formulation for Austria and Germany.
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compensation scheme contains a constant real term, which is independent of
earned wages.
Besides the theoretical analysis, this paper also derives important im-
plications for economic policy. Whether weakening unions will be a good
strategy to overcome the unemployment problem in European countries de-
pends on the bargaining set, i.e. on whether unions can bargain over wages
and employment or wages only, and on preferences and the social bene…ts
system.
Thus, this paper questions the common view that reducing the bargain-
ing power of unions would always moderate the unemployment problem of an
economy. It indicates that although this strategy may be good for some coun-
tries (e.g. the USA) it does not necessarily be e¤ective for other economies
(especially European ones).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reproduces the analysis of
Layard and Nickell (1990) under the assumption of a Stone-Geary objective
function. Modi…cations of the social compensation system are introduced in
section 3. Section 4 analyses possible implications of weakening the bargain-
ing power of unions on economic policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 E¢cient Bargaining and the Replacement
Ratio Assumption
Contrary to utilitarian objectives assumed by Layard and Nickell (1990) as
an alternative union objective a Stone Geary function is considered where the
union can put di¤erent weights on wages and employment. Taking a Stone-
6
Geary function has two advantages: First, political preferences of the trade
union leadership can be incorporated, which is important for representing
real worlds’ objectives [compare Fitzenberger (1999)]. Second, the analysis
is simpler than under the utilitarian union assumption taken by Layard and
Nickell (1990).4 However, the results derived in this paper are independent
of whether unions’ objectives of a Stone-Geary form or utilitarian unions are
assumed. (Appendix A points out that the results also hold for utilitarian
unions.)
In all other respects the framework is kept identical to Layard and Nickell
(1990). An economy with n identical …rms and unions is considered. All
…rms are unionised and bargain with their own union. Firms and unions are
assumed to be small. The Stone-Geary objective function is given by
V (w;N) = (w ¡ h)® ¡N ¡N0¢1¡® (1)
where ® > 0 and (1 ¡ ®) > 0 indicate union preferences for wages, w,
and employment, N , respectively.5 h ¸ 0 and N0 ¸ 0 are the correspond-
ing absolute minimum acceptable values. w and h are given in real terms.
V (w;N) is positive if w > h and N > N0. Without loss of generality N0 is
assumed to be zero. The utility of the union if no agreement is reached, V ,
4Note that Layard and Nickell (1990) derived their results only for a speci…c form of
individual utility functions. Furthermore, Stone-Geary objective functions are common in
the literature. Oswald (1985), Farber (1986) and Goerke and Holler (1997) give a good
review of the merits of di¤erent union objective functions. Fitzenberger (1999) stresses
the advantages of the Stone-Geary function.
5® < 1=2 thereby implies that employment has a relative higher weight in the objective
function of unions.
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then corresponds to N = 0 and is therefore zero. The minimum acceptable
wage rate, h, is given as6
h = (1 ¡ » (u))w + » (u) b, with »0 (u) > 0, » (0) = 0 and » (1) = 1: (2)
Thereby, » (u) re‡ects the probability of being unemployed if a bargaining
agreement is not reached. w , b are given in real terms and denote outside
wages and unemployment bene…ts, respectively. u is the unemployment rate,
exogenously given from the point of view of one …rm-union bargaining unit.
The …rm’s objective are pro…ts. They are given by
¦ = R (N) ¡ wN ¡ F , with RN > 0 and RNN < 0, (3)
where R is the revenue function, and F denotes capital and other …xed
costs. RN and RNN denote the …rst and the second derivative of the revenue
function with respect to employment. ¦, the pro…t of a …rm if no agreement
is reached, is assumed to be ¡F .
Let ° > 0 and (1 ¡ °) > 0 denote the bargaining power of the union and
the …rm, respectively. Then the Nash product is given by
B =
©
(w ¡ h)®N1¡®ª° fR (N) ¡ wNg1¡° . (4)
6The interpretation of h is not uniform in the literature. A discussion of di¤erent
meanings of h is given by Fehr (1990), Farber (1986) or Pencavel (1991). Seeing h as a
reference wage is one possible interpretation. Compare Fitzenberger (1999) for a similar
one. For a derivation of h from a dynamic model compare Layard et al. (1991, chapter 2
note 11). Manning (1995) presents an ad hoc formulation of the reference wage. Thereby,
he introduces the possibility that long-term unemployed are less competitive than those
who just lost their jobs. Thus, he assumes a heterogenous pool of the unemployed.
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Maximising the Nash product B with respect to wages w and employ-
ment N , taking thereby outside wages w, unemployment bene…ts b and the
unemployment rate u as given, leads to the following well known partial
equilibrium contract curve
RN (N) ¡ w
N
= ¡1 ¡ ®
®
(w ¡ h)
N
. (5)
The left-hand side of the latter equation thereby denotes the slope of the
isopro…t lines of …rms. The right-hand side is the slope of the indiference
curves of unions.7 Thus, the contract curve is the locus of the in…nite num-
ber of tangancy points between indi¤erence curves and isopro…t contours.
Compare for instance the discussion in Oswald (1985).8
After the bargaining outcome has been determined for each …rm, the gen-
eral equilibrium can be investigated by setting w = w, because all bargaining
units are identical. Since n identical small …rms are presumed the unemploy-
ment rate is determined by u =
¡
L¡ nN¢ =L, where the labour supply of the
economy L is exogenously given and …xed. Layard and Nickell (1990) argue
that the replacement ratio9, denoted by eb, rather than real bene…ts b, seems
to be constant in the real world. Generally, unemployment bene…ts are given
7Noteworthy, if unions attach eqivalent weights to wages and employment, i.e. if ® =
1=2, we obtain the well-known result that the contract curve is vertical at the partial
equilibrium level. Compare for instance the discussion in Goerke and Holler (1997):
8Note that the contract curve given by (5) is independent of the bargaining power
°. The bargaining power itself is only relevant for the determination of the particular
bargaining outcome but not for the locus of all e¢cient bargaining results, namely the
contract curve. Compare for example Oswald (1985) or Goerke and Holler (1997). We
will discuss the impact of the bargaining power ° in section 4.
9The replacement ratio measures the ratio of unemployment bene…ts to wage payments.
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by b (w) with the two polar cases b (w) = s, where s denotes constant real
bene…ts, and b (w) = ebw. In Layard and Nickell (1990) unemployment bene-
…ts do not depend on the individual but on the average wage rate which was
considered in the derivation of (2) and (5). Although this assumption seems
to be problematic (at least for some countries) it is also used in this paper
for being as near as possible to their model.10 If b (w) = ebw, the general
equilibrium unemployment rate u is implicitly de…ned by
RN (N (u)) = w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (u)
³
1 ¡eb´¶ , (6)
according to (2) and (5), where N (u) = L (1 ¡ u) =n. Due to RN > 0
(compare (3)), it directly follows from (6) that wages and the unemployment
rate are positively related for all positive values of w, which coincides with
the …nding of Layard and Nickell (1990).11 This result is independent of how
much relative weight unions attach to employment.
10For the consequences of allowing bene…ts to depend on the individual wage rate, see
Beissinger and Egger (2000).
11For a formal derivation de…ne
¥(u;w) ´ RN (N (u)) ¡ w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (u)
³
1 ¡eb´¶ = 0,
according to (6). Using the implicit function theorem gives
du
dw
=
h
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡eb´i
RNN (¢) dNdu + w 1¡®® »0 (u)
³
1 ¡eb´ .
Note that the numerator on the right hand side of the latter equation is positive. More-
over, be aware that, according to (6), RN > 0 implies for all w > 0 that the equilibrium
unemployment rate ful…lls 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡eb´ < 1, according to (6). Then, du=dw > 0
directly follows.
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Noteworthy, the …nding of Layard and Nickell that e¢cient bargaining
cannot reduce the unemployment rate in a general equilibrium framework
critically depends on the assumption that unemployment bene…ts are a con-
stant fraction of wages, i.e. b (w) = ebw. This together with RN > 0 implies
that the whole labour force of the economy L is employed in the absence of
unions. Thus, it is clear that e¢cient bargaining over wages and employment
of …rms and unions cannot reduce the unemployment rate, since it is zero in
the absence of unions.
In the following section we modify the social compensation system, so
that there is some unemployment in the absence of unions. Under this mod-
i…cation we question the robustness of the Layard and Nickell result.
3 Di¤erent Unemployment Compensation Sys-
tems
Although Layard and Nickell (1990) argued that constant real bene…ts (inde-
pendent of previous earnings) seem not to be a realistic assumption, in most
OECD countries compensation schemes are common which contain both a
constant percentage of wage payments and social assistance payments, which
are independent of (previous) earnings. Furthermore, the United Kingdom
has established a pure Beveridgian compensation system [compare OECD
(1991)]. If the unemployment compensation scheme contains a constant real
term (associated with social assistance payments), unemployment may also
arise in the absence of unions. But, as it will be shown below, if this is
the case, i.e. if unemployment indeed arises in the absence of unions (in
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our case due to social assistance payments) union activities may reduce the
unemployment rate.
This section investigates three variants of unemployment compensation
schemes. First, constant real bene…ts are analysed. Starting with the polar
case opposed to the Bismarckian system of section 2 may give a …rst insight
into the robustness of the result derived above.
3.1 The Beveridge System
Consider constant real bene…ts, b (w) = s, and u =
¡
L¡ nN¢ =L (since n
identical …rms are presumed). The general equilibrium unemployment rate,
denoted as uc, is implicitly de…ned by
RN (N (uc)) ¡ 1 ¡ ®® » (uc) s = w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc)
¶
, (7)
according to (2) and (5).12 Thus, uc is a function of w, ®, s, L and n.
Suppressing L and n, which are irrelevant for the results of this paper, for
notational simplicity, we have uc (w;®; s).
Let u0 denote unemployment in the absence of unions which is implicitly
de…ned by RN (N (u)) = s. (Thus, u0 is a function of s.) Now assume that
unemployment, u0 > 0, exists in the absence of unions due to real bene…ts
12Equation (7) does not de…ne the particular equilibrium unemployment-wage combi-
nation determined by the bargaining outcome of all …rm-union pairs, which also depends
on the bargaining power of …rms and unions. Contrary, (7) implicitly de…nes all combi-
nations of unemployment rates and wage rates which are consistent with an equilibrium.
Looking only on the possible existence of an unemployment decreasing e¢cient bargain-
ing outcome, the particular equilibrium unemployment-wage combination is of no interest
here.
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s.13 (Otherwise unemployment cannot decrease by de…nition, independent of
whether unions bargain over wages and employment or wages only.) More-
over, let u be implicitly de…ned by 1¡®® » (u) = 1. Then, the following lemma
can be derived.14
Lemma 1 Given ®, s and thus u, u0, we have: For all possible w
uc (¢) 2 ]u; u0] if 1 ¡ ®® » (u0) > 1,
uc (¢) 2 [u0; u[ if 1 ¡ ®® » (u0) < 1 and (8)
uc (¢) = u0 if 1 ¡ ®® » (u0) = 1.
Proof. See appendix B.
Lemma 1 indicates that the bargaining over wages and employment can
reduce the unemplyoment rate. However, if u0 < 1, a necessary condition
for this outcome is that employment has a relative higher weight in the
objective function of unions, i.e. that 1¡®® > 1. The reason for the latter is
that » (u) · 1, according to (2). The following proposition summarizes the
main …nding.
Proposition 1 Unless the unemployment rate in the absence of unions is
zero, i.e. for u0 > 0, e¢cient bargaining can lead to an unemployment
13Note that the critical assumption is to allow for unemployment in the absence of
unions. The literature identi…es a number of possible causes (besides unionization) for
unemployment to arise. But, since we do not deal with e¢cient wages, search and matching
problems, etc., we assume that unemployment arises in the absence of unions due to
constant real bene…ts.
14According to lemma 1, u denotes a lower bound if u < u0 and an upper bound if
u > u0.
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decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium framework if the un-
employment compensation scheme is Beveridgian.
Proof. Directly follows from lemma 1 since u0 > 0 implies » (u0) > 0.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is the following. If there is unemploy-
ment in the absence of unions, i.e. if u0 > 0, the unemployment rate may be
reduced if …rms and unions bargain over wages and employment. Whether or
not unemployment is reduced by the bargaining outcome thereby critically
depends on the relative weight unions attach to employment. As pointed
out after lemma 1, an unemployment reducing bargaining outcome at the
aggregate level is only possible if the relative weight of employment in the
objective of unions is higher than one, i.e. 1¡®® > 1. Moreover, for a given
® < 1=2, whether or not e¢cient bargaining reduces the unemployment rate
critically depends on the constant real bene…t term s, which itself determines
the unemployment rate in the absence of unions u0. Compare lemma 1. A
higher s increases the probability of an uneployment decreasing bargaining
outcome.
Figure 1 shows the relation between the equilibrium unemployment rate
and wage rate determined by uc (w;®; s). For a given ® < 1=2 and thus for
a given u, constant real bene…ts s determine whether the impact of the wage
rate on the unemployment rate is positive or negative. On the one hand, if
s is su¢ciently small, we have u0 < u. In this case, the unemployment rate
increases with the wage rate (the left bough of …gure 1). If on the other hand
real bene…ts are high enough, we have u0 > u so that the unemployment rate
decreases with the wage rate (right bough).15
15For the impact of the wage rate on the equilibrium unemployment rate compare the
14
>Figure 1<
Appendix A analyses the relation between the equilibrium unemployment
rate and wage rate for constant real bene…ts under utilitarian unions. Al-
though this analysis is more complex than the one drawn in this section,
it turns out that the result, namely that e¢cient bargaining can lead to
an unemployment decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium
framework also holds if unions’ objectives are assumed to be utilitarian.
The intuition for this …nding is again that unemployment in the absence of
unions allows for an unemployment decreasing bargaining outcome if …rms
and unions bargain over wages and employment. Thus, the consideration of
the Beveridge system raises doubts about the robustness of the conclusion
drawn by Layard and Nickell (1990) independent of whether Stone-Geary
objectives or utilitarian unions are presumed.
Section 3.2. analyses unemployment compensations which cover a repla-
cement ratio and a constant real term.
3.2 A Mixed Unemployment Compensation System
A mixed unemployment compensation scheme can be formalised as a convex
combination of the two polar cases discussed in sections 2 and 3.1 given by16
proof of lemma 1 in appendix B.
16Beissinger and Büsse (1999) introduced such an unemployment compensation scheme
into the trade union literature. They thought of long term unemployed as an example
for persons getting only social assistance payments. Therefore the unemployed are no
longer a homogenous group. This extension is not considered here. For a discussion
of this extension compare Beissinger and Büsse (1999). A di¤erent formalization of the
15
b (w) = Âebw + (1 ¡ Â) s, 0 · Â · 1, (9)
where s > 0 denotes social assistance payments (‡at component) and the
parametereb > 0 indicates the replacement ratio. Weight Â can be interpreted
as the portion of bene…ts dependent on wage payments. 1¡Â weights social
assistance payments in the income of an unemployed. Âeb ¸ 0 can be called
the Bismarckian factor. A Beveridgian system is characterised by Â = 0.
Denote the general equilibrium unemployment rate as buc, implicitly de…ned
by
RN (N (buc))¡ 1 ¡ ®® » (buc) (1 ¡ Â) s = w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc)³1 ¡ Âeb´¶ ; (10)
according to (2), (5) and (9). Thus, buc is a function of w, ®, Â, eb,
s, L and n. Suppressing again L and n for notational simplicity we havebuc ³w;®; Â;eb; s´.
Let bu0 denote the unemployment rate in the absence of unions, which
is implicitly de…ned by RN = s(1¡Â)(1¡Âeb) . (Thus, bu0 is a function of Â, eb and
s.) Again, the presumption that unemployment, bu0 > 0, arises in the
absence of unions is critical. Furthermore, let eu be implicitly de…ned by
1¡®
® » (eu)³1 ¡ Âeb´ = 1. Then, the following lemma can be derived.17
Lemma 2 Given ®, Â, eb, s and thus eu, bu0, we have: For all possible w
unemployment compensation scheme, which also covers both, a replacement ratio and a
constant real term, is presented by Cremer and Pestieau (1998).
17According to lemma 2, eu denotes a lower bound if eu < bu0 and an upper bound ifeu > bu0.
16
buc (¢) 2 ]eu; bu0] if 1 ¡ ®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1,buc (¢) 2 [bu0; eu[ if 1 ¡ ®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1 and (11)buc (¢) = bu0 if 1 ¡ ®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ = 1.
Proof. See appendix C.
Lemma 2 indicates that the bargaining over wages and employment can
reduce the unemplyoment rate. Again, a necessary condition for this outcome
is that employment has a relative higher weight in the objective function of
unions, i.e. that 1¡®® > 1. Compare the discussion after lemma 1. Similar to
above, the main …nding is summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Unless the unemployment rate in the absence of unions is
zero, i.e. for bu0 > 0, e¢cient bargaining can lead to an unemployment
decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium framework if the un-
employment compensation scheme covers a replacement ratio and a constant
real term.
Proof. Directly follows from lemma 2 since bu0 > 0 implies » (bu0) > 0.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is similar to the intuition behind
proposition 1. If there is unemployment in the absence of unions, i.e. ifbu0 > 0, the unemployment rate may be reduced if …rms and unions bargain
over wages and employment. Again, a higher s increases the probability
of an uneployment decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium
framework.
17
Figure 2 shows the relation between the equilibrium unemployment rate
and the wage rate, determined by buc ³w;®; Â;eb; s´, if the compensation
scheme is given by (9). For given parameters ®, Â andeb (with 1¡®® ³1 ¡ Âeb´ >
1) and thus for a given eu, social assistance payments s determine whether the
impact of the wage rate on the unemployment rate is positive or negative.
On the one hand, if s is su¢ciently small we have bu0 < eu. In this case, the
unemployment rate increases with the wage rate (the left bough of …gure 2).
On the other hand, if real bene…ts are high enough we have bu0 > eu so that
the unemployment rate decreases with the wage rate (right bough).18
>Figure 2<
Section 3.3 modi…es the compensation system given by (9) and introduces
the idea of a guaranteed minimum income for the unemployed which can be
found in most European economies (Italy, Germany, Austria, etc.).
3.3 A Mixed Compensation System with a Guaranteed
Minimum Income
The unemployment compensation scheme covers again a replacement ratio
and a constant real term. But, contrary to section 3.2 the constant real term
denotes a guaranteed minimum income. Thus, the compensation scheme is
given by
b (w) = Âmax
nebw; so + (1 ¡ Â) s, 0 · Â · 1 (12)
18For the impact of the wage rate on the equilibrium unemployment rate compare the
proof of lemma 2 in appendix C.
18
On the one hand, if , ebw < s, then b (w) = s and, on the other hand, ifebw ¸ s, then b (w) is given by (9). The relation between the unemployment
rate and the wage rate in the general equilibrium is determined by (7) ifebw < s and by (10) if ebw ¸ s. The impact of the wage rate on the equi-
librium unemployment rate for these two cases is represented by …gure 3.
Remember that u0 is the unemployment rate in the absence of unions which
is implicitly de…ned by RN = s: Compare the discussion in section 3.1. Then,
the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 3 Unless the unemployment rate in the absence of unions is
zero, i.e. for u0 > 0, e¢cient bargaining can lead to an unemployment
decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium framework if the un-
employment compensation scheme covers a guaranteed minimum income.
Proof. Directly follows from propositions 1 and 2.
The intuition for proposition 3 is similar to the intuitions for propositions
1 and 2. If there is unemployment in the absence of unions, i.e. if u0 > 0, the
unemployment rate may be reduced if …rms and unions bargain over wages
and employment. As in sections 3.1 and 3.2, we again …nd that the possibil-
ity of an unemployment reducing bargaining outcome at the aggregate level
critically depends on the relative weight unions attach to employment. A
relative higher weight for employment in the objective of unions is thereby a
necessary condition. Again, a higher s increases the probability of an unem-
ployment decreasing bargaining outcome in a general equilibrium framework.
>Figure 3<
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Section 4 investigates plausible combinations of (7) and (10) and works
out some interesting results and implications for economic policy. The focus
lies on the e¤ect of weakening unions if the existence of bargaining is good
for employment, a result that is not common in the literature on e¢cient
bargaining in a general equilibrium framework.
4 Implications for Economic Policy
To investigate the impact of the bargaining power of unions ° on unem-
ployment u we di¤erentiate the Nash product given by equation (4) with
respect to employment level N . This gives after some transformations the
well-known rent sharing curve
w =
1 ¡ °
1 ¡ °®RN (N) +
° (1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ °®
R (N)
N
. (13)
Thereby, R (N) =N are average revenues per employee, with R (N) =N >
RN (N) due to the concavity of the revenue function. The rent sharing curve
(RSC) determines which share of a …rm’s rent employees get. The rent
itself is endogenously determined in the bargaining process. The particular
unemployment-wage combination set in the e¢cient bargain of …rms and
unions in the general equilibrium is then given by the intersection of the rent
sharing curve (RSC) with the relevant social contract curve (CC), given by
(6), (7) or (10).19
19Remember that the social contract curves given by (6), (7) and (10), respectively, are
loci of the in…nite number of e¢cient wage employment combinations.
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In the following we focus on cases where bargaining decreases the unem-
ployment rate. Then, the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 4 Suppose that e¢cient bargaining exhibits an unemployment
decreasing bargaining outcome. Then, weakening unions, i.e. a decline in °,
has a negative impact on employment if the comepnsation scheme is Beverid-
gian or given by (9). In addition, weakeing strong and strengthening weak
unions may be a good policy option for reducing the unemployment rate if the
compensation system is given by (12).20
Proof. See appendix D.
Proposition 4 states that if the compensation scheme is given by b (w) = s
or by (9) and if u0 > u (section 3.1) or bu0 > eu (section 3.2), respectively,
a reduction of the bargaining power of trade unions, i.e. a reduction of °,
increases the unemployment rate and decreases the wage rate. To see this,
note that a decline in the bargaining power ° implies that unions can at-
tract a lower share of the …rms’ rents in the bargaining process. For any
given employment level N , wages w determined by (13) are decreasing in the
bargaining power of unions °. As a result, and since it is assumed that equi-
librium wages and the unemployment rate are negatively related, according
to the social contract curves given by (7) and (10), whereas the rent-sharing
curve reveals a positive relation of wages and the unemployment rate, accord-
ing to (13), both w and N are decreasing if the bargaining power of unions
declines.21 Thus, if e¢cient bargaining has an unemployment decreasing ef-
20Noteworthy, we use the term weak unions if ebw < s, so that (7) is the relevant contract
curve. Unions are said to be strong, if ebw ¸ s so that (10) is the relvant contract curve.
21For the …rst derivative of the rent-sharing curve compare eq. (D6) in appendix D.
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fect and the unemployment compensation scheme is Beveridgian or given by
(9) weakening unions (which means a reduction of °) is not a good policy
option since it aggravates the unemployment problem of an economy.
If the unemployment compensation scheme incorporates a guaranteed
minimum income, formalised by (12), drawing a conclusion becomes more
di¢cult. In particular, as long as ebw < s, (7) de…nes the relation between
the equilibrium unemployment rate and the wage rate. But if ebw ¸ s, (10)
becomes relevant. Thus, a critical wage rate, i.e. w = s=eb, exists, where the
system shifts. Assuming u0 > u the following two cases can be distinguished.
Case I: 1¡®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1
In this case, the relation between the unemployment rate and the wage rate
will be negative in the relevant area w ¸ s, which is shown by the contract
curve CC in …gure 4. Note that a reduction in the bargaining power of
unions unambiguously reduces the wage rate in equilibrium. But, contrary
to the results of right-to-manage models and the conclusion of Layard and
Nickell (1990) the equilibrium unemployment rate rises with a decrease in the
bargaining power of unions due to the negative relation between the wage
rate and the equilibrium unemployment rate determined by lemmas 1 and
2. This can be seen by comparing the two intersection points A and A0 in
…gure 4.
>Figure 4<
Thus, it turns out that in this case weakening unions worsens the unem-
ployment problem of an economy.
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Case II: 1¡®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1
In this case, the relation between the unemployment rate and the wage rate
given by (7) is negative because of 1¡®® » (u0) > 1, whereas the relation deter-
mined by (10) is positive. Figure 5 represents a situation where bu0 > u andbu0 < eu < u0, i.e. a parameter constellation where e¢cient bargaining leads
to a decrease in the unemployment rate.
>Figure 5<
Take into account that the rent sharing curve given by (13) is increasing
in the (w; u)-space of …gure 5 and consider, according to above that for a
given employment level N (for a given u) wages determined by (13) are
decreasing if the bargaining power of unions declines. (Compare RSC (°0)
and RSC (e°0) ; with e°0 < °0; in …gure 5) Then, point A in …gure 5 (with w >
s=eb) indicates an economy with strong unions whereas point B denotes an
economy with weak unions. In this case, according to proposition 4 and …gure
5, for 1¡®® » (u0) > 1 and
1¡®
® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1 the following conclusion can
be derived: If unions are strong, weakening unions may be a reasonable
political instrument to …ght high unemployment rates. Compare intersection
points A and A0 in …gure 5.22 But, if unions are already weak, reducing their
bargaining power will aggravate the unemployment problem of an economy.
22As …gure 5 indicates, this conclusion only holds for su¢ciently small reductions of
the bargaining power of unions. Otherwise, weakening strong unions will aggravate the
unemployment problem. Compare point A and point B for a reduction of the bargaining
power of unions from °0 to e°0.
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Compare points B and B0.23
5 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated the following: If unemployment exists in the
absence of unions (e.g. due to social assistance payments) then, in a general
equilibrium framework where all …rms are unionised and bargain with their
own union an unemployment decreasing e¤ect of e¢cient bargaining may
occur. Thus, the conclusion of Layard and Nickell (1990) that “(...) the wage
rate will move in the same direction as the unemployment rate (...)” (p.
786-7) critically depends on the choice of the unemployment compensation
scheme (and their assumption that no unemployment occurs in the absence
of unions).
In this paper di¤erent compensation systems including a Beveridgian one,
a Bismarckian one and combinations of these polar cases, have been investi-
gated for a Stone-Geary objective function. The results show that e¢cient
bargaining can have an unemployment decreasing e¤ect in a general equilib-
rium framework if the compensation scheme contains a constant real term,
23Note that an unemployment decreasing bargaining outcome does not necessarily oc-
cur if 1¡®® » (bu0) ³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1. In particular, if eu > u0 the unemployment rate under
bargaining may be higher than the unemployment rate in the absence of unions. Thus,
1¡®
® » (u0) > 1 is not su¢cient for the unemployment rate under e¢cient bargaining to
be lower than the unemployment rate in the absence of unions, u0, if the unemployment
compensation system contains both a replacement ratio term, ebw, and social assistance
payments, s, which are a guaranteed minimum income. But the conclusion that weaken-
ing strong and strengthening weak unions may reduce unemployment holds independent
of whether eu R u0.
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which is independent of earned wages. Such a term can be interpreted as so-
cial assistance payments, which are common in most OECD countries. The
more accentuated social assistance payments are , i.e. the higher the weight
and the level of the constant real term, and/or the lower the replacement
ratio is, the more likely is a decrease in the unemployment rate caused by
e¢cient bargaining. Moreover, higher relative union preferences for employ-
ment, also make an unemployment decreasing e¤ect of e¢cient bargaining
more likely. Therefore, the judgement on the employment e¤ects of e¢cient
bargaining has not to be as negative as in Layard and Nickell (1990).
The political recommendation is ambiguous and depends on the con-
crete form of the compensation system and the relative union preference for
employment. Weakening unions can reduce or worsen the unemployment
problem of an economy. For instance, weakening strong and strengthening
weak unions can lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate. This ques-
tions the robustness of the common view that weakening trade unions would
unambiguously reduce the unemployment problem of European economies.
Appendix
A. E¢cient Bargaining, Utilitarian Unions and Con-
stant Real Bene…ts: The Layard and Nickell Model
If utilitarian unions are assumed, one union’s contribution to the Nash bar-
gain is given by
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Z ¡ Z = N ¡U (w) ¡ U¢ , (A1)
where N is employment, U (w) denotes utility of income w and U is a
worker’s reservation utility determined by24
U = (1 ¡ » (u))U (w) + » (u)U (b) , »0 (u) > 0, » (0) = 0, » (1) = 1, (A2)
where w, w and b are given in real terms. w and b denote outside wages
and unemployment bene…ts. » (u) is de…ned as in section 2 and re‡ects the
probability of being unemployed if a bargaining agreement is not reached.
The …rm’s objective are pro…ts, given by (3). Again, ° is the bargaining
power of the union and 1 ¡ ° the bargaining power of the …rm. Solving the
bargaining problem
max
w;N
B =
©
N
£
U (w) ¡ U¤ª° fR (N) ¡ wNg1¡° , (A3)
for given outside wages w, unemployment bene…ts b and the unemploy-
ment rate u leads to the well known partial equilibrium formulation
w ¡RN = U (w) ¡ UUw (w) , (A4)
where Uw (w) denotes the derivative of U with respect to w. Once the
bargaining outcome is determined for each …rm, the general equilibrium with
n …rms and unions is obtained by setting w equal to w, since all bargain-
ing pairs are identical. For an explicit solution the utility functions are
24For a derivation of U ¡ U see Layard and Nickell (1990).
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speci…ed by U (y) = ya with 0 < a < 1 and y 2 fw; bg following Layard
and Nickell (1990). Use this speci…cation and w = w in (A2) and further-
more consider that the general equilibrium unemployment rate is given by
u =
¡
L¡ nN¢ =L. Then, equation (A4) becomes
RN (N (u)) = w
·
1 ¡ » (u) (1 ¡ (s=w)
a)
a
¸
, (A5)
with constant real bene…ts b = s, a standard assumption of the wage
bargaining theory in an orthodox partial equilibrium framework.
Layard and Nickell (1990) argue that not real bene…ts b but rather the
replacement ratio eb seems to be constant in the real world. Thus, they set
b = ebw25 so that (A4) becomes
RN (N (u)) = w
241 ¡ » (u)
³
1 ¡eba´
a
35 . (A6)
Equation (A5) corresponds to a Beveridgian unemployment compensa-
tion system whereas (A6) corresponds to a Bismarckian one without a social
assistance term.
The Bismarckian case with a constant replacement ratio is the one for
which Layard and Nickell (1990) have shown that unemployment and wages
are always positively related. So the remaining task of appendix A is to
question the robustness of this result if the unemployment bene…ts scheme
is modi…ed.
25For a more general representation of unemployment bene…ts compare section 2. Re-
meber that, according to Layard and Nickell (1990), unemployment bene…ts depend on
the average wage rate, which was considered in the derivation of (A2) and (A4).
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Use (A5) to de…ne
¡ (u; w) ´ RN (N (u)) ¡ w
·
1 ¡ » (u) (1 ¡ (s=w)
a)
a
¸
= 0.
Then, applying the implicit function theorem to the latter equation yields
after some transformations
a <
» (u) (1 ¡ (s=w)a)
1 ¡ » (u) (s=w)a , (A7)
as necessary condition for a negative impact of wages on unemployment.
Denote the unemployment rate in the absence of unions implicitly de…ned
by RN = s as u0. Again, u0 > 0 is critical for an unemployment decreasing
e¤ect of e¢cient bargaining. Now consider (A5) and (A7), then
» (u0) (1 ¡ (s=w)a) < a < » (u0) (1 ¡ (s=w)
a)
1 ¡ » (u0) (s=w)a (A8)
is su¢cient for an unemployment decreasing e¤ect. Note thatRN (N (u)) >
0 and therefore a > » (u0) (1 ¡ (s=w)a) is presumed, according to (A5). Al-
though (A7) has only been derived for marginal variations in w and N it
can be shown that (A8) is also su¢cient for discrete variations in the vari-
ables. Consider that (A5) is continuous in the relevant area, that w > s and
RN > 0, and that …nally
dQ
dw
=
1 ¡ » (u0) (s=w)a ¡ » (u0) (1 ¡ (s=w)a)
[1 ¡ » (u0) (s=w)a]2 £
a
w
» (u0)
³ s
w
´a
> 0, (A9)
with Q ´ (» (u0) (1 ¡ (s=w)a)) = (1 ¡ » (u0) (s=w)a). Then, it is not pos-
sible to …nd a (w; u) combination with w > s and u > u0 that lies on the
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continuous contract curve de…ned by (A5) and for which condition (A8) is
met. Thus, (A8) is also su¢cient for discrete variations.
Summing up, the conclusion of Layard and Nickell (1990) that “(...) in
all cases the wage rate will move in the same direction as the unemployment
rate (...)” (p. 786-7) depends also under utilitarian unions critically on
the unemployment compensation system. If there is unemployment in the
absence of unions e¢cient bargaining over wages and employment may re-
duce the unemployment rate. A necessary assumption for an unemployment
decreasing bargaining outcome are thereby risk-averse workers, i.e. a < 1,
according to (A7). ¥
B. Proof of lemma 1
Consider u0 (s) and uc (w;®; s) as de…ned in section 3.1. Then, (7) can be
transformed into
s
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc (¢))
¶
> w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc (¢))
¶
, (B1)
for all possible uc (¢) < u0. The latter follows due to RN (N (u0)) = s and
RNN < 0. Since unions can only exist if w ¸ s, 1¡®® » (uc (¢)) > 1 is necessary
for RN (N (uc (¢))) < s.
Analogously, (7) can be transformed into
s
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc (¢))
¶
< w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc (¢))
¶
, (B2)
for all possible uc (¢) > u0. Thus, 1¡®® » (uc (¢)) < 1 is necessary for
RN (N (uc (¢))) > s.
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Finally (7) holds for RN (N (uc (¢))) = s if w = RN or if w 6= RN and
1¡®
® » (uc (¢)) = 1. Using this together with (B1) and (B2), we obtain
[RN (N (uc (¢))) ¡ s]
·
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (uc (¢))
¸
¸ 0. (B3)
Now consider u (¢) de…ned in section 3.1 and »0 (u) > 0. Furthermore,
consider (B3) and note that duc (¢) =dw R 0 if 1¡®® » (uc (¢)) Q 1.26 Then, for
given ® and s and thus for given u and u0, uc (¢) approaches with an increase
in the wage rate asymptotically to the lower bound of the unemployment rate
u, with u0 > u > 027, if and only if 1¡®® » (u0) > 1 because (7) is continuous
for all uc (¢) 2 ]u; u0]. Accordingly, uc (¢) approaches with an increase in the
wage rate asymptotically to the upper bound of the unemployment rate u,
with u > u0 > 0, if and only if 1¡®® » (u0) < 1 because (7) is continuous for
all uc (¢) 2 [u0; u[. Finally, if 1¡®® » (u0) = 1 we have uc = u0 independent of
w. This completes the proof of lemma 1. ¥
C. Proof of lemma 2
The proof of lemma 2 is similar to the proof of lemma 1. Consider bu0 ³Â;eb; s´
and buc ³w;®;Â;eb; s´ as de…ned in section 3.2. Then, (10) can be transformed
into
26Use uc (¢) in equation (7) and di¤erentiate (7) with respect to w. This yields after
some transformations
duc
dw
=
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (uc (¢))
1¡®
® »
0 (uc) (w ¡ s) + RNN (dN=duc) ,
which implies duc (¢) =dw R 0 if 1¡®® » (uc (¢)) Q 1.
27Remember, u denotes a lower bound if u < u0 and an upper bound if u > u0.
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s
µ
1 ¡ Â
1 ¡ Âeb ¡ 1 ¡ ®® » (buc (¢)) (1 ¡ Â)
¶
>
w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´¶ , (C1)
for all possible buc (¢) < bu0. The latter follows due to RN (N (bu0)) = s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb
and RNN < 0. Since unions can only exist if w ¸ s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb ,
1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1
is necessary for RN (N (buc (¢))) < s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb .
Analogously, (10) can be transformed into
s
µ
1 ¡ Â
1 ¡ Âeb ¡ 1 ¡ ®® » (buc (¢)) (1 ¡ Â)
¶
<
w
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´¶ , (C2)
for all possible buc (¢) > bu0. Thus,
1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1
is necessary for RN (N (buc (¢))) > s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb .
Finally, (10) holds for RN (N (buc (¢))) = s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb if w = RN or if w 6= RN
and
1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ = 1.
Using this together with (C1) and (C2), as a result we obtain
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·
RN (N (buc (¢))) ¡ s 1 ¡ Â
1 ¡ Âeb
¸
£
·
1 ¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
» (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´¸ ¸ 0 (C3)
Now consider eu (¢) de…ned in section 3.2. and »0 (u) > 0. Furthermore,
consider (C3) and note that dbuc (¢) =dw R 0 if 1¡®® » (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ Q
1.28 Then, for given ®, Â, eb and s and thus for given eu and bu0, buc (¢)
approaches with an increase in the wage rate asymptotically to the lower
bound of the unemployment rate eu, with bu0 > eu > 029, if and only if
1¡®
® » (bu0 (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1 since (10) is continuous for all buc (¢) 2 ]eu; bu0]. Ac-
cordingly, buc (¢) approaches with an increase in the wage rate asymptotically
to the upper bound of the unemployment rate eu, with eu > bu0 > 0, if and only
if 1¡®® » (bu0 (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1 since (10) is continuous for all buc (¢) 2 [bu0; eu[.
Finally, if 1¡®® » (bu0 (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´ = 1 we obtain buc = bu0 independent of w.
This completes the proof of lemma 2. ¥
D. Proof of proposition 4
First, we derive the impact of ° on the unemployment rate if the compensa-
tion scheme is Beveridgian, i.e. if b (w) = s.
Let us de…ne the implicit function
28Use buc (¢) in equation (10) and di¤erentiate (10) with respect to w. This yields after
some transformations
dbuc
dw
=
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (buc (¢)) ³1 ¡ Âeb´
1¡®
® »
0 (buc (¢))³1 ¡ Âeb´³w ¡ s 1¡Â1¡Âeb´ + RNN (dN=dbuc)
which implies dbuc (¢) =dw R 0 if 1¡®® » (buc (¢)) ³1 ¡ Âeb´ Q 1.
29Remember, eu denotes a lower bound if eu < bu0 and an upper bound if eu > bu0.
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Á (u; °) ´ Ã (u; °) ¡ · (u) = 0, (D1)
according to (7), (13) and u =
¡
L¡ nN¢ =L, where
Ã (u; °) ´ 1 ¡ °
1 ¡ °®RN (N (u)) +
° (1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ °®
R (N (u))
N (u)
and (D2)
· (u) ´ RN (N (u))
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
¡
1¡®
® » (u) s
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
(D3)
are used. Note that 1¡®® » (u) 6= 1 is assumed. According to the implicit
function theorem, we know that
du
d°
= ¡@Á (u; °) =@°
@Á (u; °) =@u
= ¡ @Ã (u; °) =@°
@Ã (u; °) =@u¡ d· (u) =du . (D4)
According to (D2), we obtain
@Ã (u; °)
@°
=
1 ¡ ®
(1 ¡ °®)2
·
R (N (u))
N (u)
¡RN (N (u))
¸
. (D5)
Due to R (N) =N > RN (N), which is a consequence of the concavity of
the revenue function, it follows that @Ã (u; °) =@° > 0. In addition di¤eren-
tiating (D2) with respect to u gives
@Ã (u; °)
@u
=
·
1 ¡ °
1 ¡ °®RNN +
° (1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ °®
[RN (¢)N ¡R (¢)]
N2
¸
dN
du
. (D6)
UsingR (N) =N > RN (N) and dN=du < 0, it turns out that @Ã (u; °) =@u >
0. Finally, from (D3) we obtain
@· (u)
@u
=
RNN (¢)
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
dN
du
+
[RN (¢) ¡ s] 1¡®® »0 (u)£
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
¤2 . (D7)
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Since u 2 ]u; u0[ is assumed and the relevant contract curve is given by
· (u),we have 1¡®® » (u) > 1, according to the proof of lemma 1. Moreover,
remember that RN (N (u0)) = s and use RNN < 0 to …nd RN (N (u)) < s
for all u < u0. Together with dN=du < 0, we obtain @· (u) =@u < 0. Using
the latter together with @Ã (u; °) =@° > 0 and @Ã (u; °) =@u > 0 in (D4)
proves that du=d° < 0 if the unemployment compensation scheme is given
by b (w) = s and e¢cient bargaining reduces the unemployment rate, i.e. if
u 2 ]u; u0[, according to lemma 1.
Second, assume that the unemployment compensation scheme is given by
(9) instead of b (w) = s. In this case we de…ne
e· (u) ´ RN (N (u)) ¡ 1¡®® » (u) (1 ¡ Â) s
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´ , (D8)
according to (10). Note that 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´ 6= 1 is assumed. Di¤er-
entiating e· (u) with respect to u gives
de· (u)
du
=
RNN (¢)
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´ dNdu
+
1¡®
® »
0 (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´ hRN (¢) ¡ s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb ih
1 ¡ 1¡®® » (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´i2 . (D9)
Since u 2 ]eu; bu0[ is assumed and the relevant contract curve is given bye· (u), we have 1¡®® » (u)³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1, according to the proof of lemma 2.
Moreover, remember that RN (N (bu0)) = s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb and use RNN < 0 to …nd
RN (N (u)) < s(1¡Â)1¡Âeb for all u < bu0. Together with dN=du < 0, we …nd
@e· (u) =@u < 0. Now, substitute e· (u) for · (u) in (D1) and @e· (u) =@u for
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@· (u) =@u in (D4). Then, using @e· (u) =@u < 0 together with @Ã (u; °) =@° >
0 and @Ã (u; °) =@u > 0 in (D4) proves that du=d° < 0 if the unemployment
compensation scheme is given by (9) and e¢cient bargaining reduces the
unemployment rate, i.e. u 2 ]eu; bu0[, according to lemma 2.
Third, assume that the unemployment compensation scheme is given by
(12). Then, according to RN (N (u0)) = s and RN (N (bu0)) = s(1¡Â)(1¡Âeb) , we …nd
that u0 > bu0. u0 2 ]0; 1[ is assumed. Moreover, since u is implicitly deter-
mined by 1¡®® » (u) = 1 and eu implicitly determined by 1¡®® » (eu)³1 ¡ Âeb´ = 1,
we …nd that u < eu holds, according to »0 (u) > 1, where eu 2 ]0; 1[ is assumed.
Thus, e¢cient bargaining can only have an unemployment decreasing e¤ect
if 1¡®® » (u0) > 1 holds.
In the following we do not want to give a comprehensive discussion on
possible impacts of the bargaining power of unions on the equilibrium un-
employment rate. Rather we want to show that weakening strong as well as
strengthening weak unions (as stated in proposition 4) may reduce the un-
employment rate in a general equilibrium framework. Therefore, we assume
that there is only a single crossing of the contract curve (composed of (7)
and (10) for ebw < s and ebw ¸ s, respectively), on the one hand, and the rent
sharing curve given by (13), on the other hand.30 Under the single crossing
assumption the following results can be derived.
30Note that it is easy to show that an equilibrium always exists, since the rent-sharing
curve lies strictly above the marginal-return-to-labour curve for all ° > 0 and positive
employment levels N > 0 according to the rent-sharing curve given by (13). However,
analysing the uniqueness of equilibria is far beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the
possibility of single crossing in the case of a composed contract curve introduced in section
3.3 has been veri…ed in a simulation analysis for a well-speci…ed revenue function.
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If unions are weak, so that the equilibrium wage-unemployment combi-
nation is determined by the intersection of (7) and (13), i.e. if ebw < s31,
du=d° < 0 follows according to (D1)-(D7) and the discussion thereafter.
If in contrast, ebw > s holds in equilibrium (which is a possible outcome),
we have to substitute e· (u), determined in (D8) for · (u) in (D1) and addi-
tionally @e· (u) =@u for @· (u) =@u in (D4). In this case we speak of strong
unions. Compare the discussion in the footnote of proposition 4. Then, ac-
cording to u0 > bu0 and u < eu two cases have to be distinguished. (i) If
1¡®
® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ > 1, de· (u) =du < 0 and therefore also du=d° < 0 follows,
according to (D9) and the discussion therafter. (ii) If 1¡®® » (bu0)³1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1,
de· (u) =du > 0 results for all u 2 ]bu0; eu[ and w > s=eb. To see this, note that
1¡®
® » (u)
³
1 ¡ Âeb´ < 1 holds for all u 2 ]bu0; eu[, according to the proof of
lemma 2. Moreover, due to RN (N (bu0)) = s(1¡Â)(1¡Âeb) and RNN < 0 it follows
that RN (N (u)) > s(1¡Â)(1¡Âeb) holds for all u > bu0. Substituting de· (u) =du for
d· (u) =du in (D4) and considering @Ã (u; °) =@° > 0 and @Ã (u; °) =@u > 0
we …nd that
du=d° T 0 if @Ã (u; °) =@u S de· (u) =du. (D10)
Take account of the fact that the contract curve given by (10) has a pos-
itive slope in the range u 2 ]bu0; eu[ and that the rent sharing curve given
by (13) is negatively sloped in the (w; u)-space. Moreover, remember that
we have assumed a single crossing (i.e. a unique intersection point) of the
contract curve and the rent sharing curve and consider lim
u!eu de· (u) =du = 1.
31Note that this is a possible outcome of the bargaining depending on the size of ° and
compare the discussion in the footnote of proposition 4.
36
Then, it follows that @Ã (u; °) =@u < de· (u) =du must hold at the intersec-
tion point of the contract curve given by (10) and the rent sharing curve
determined in (13).
Finally, considering our …ndings from above and using the term weak and
strong as de…ned in proposition 1 it turns out that (marginally) weakening
strong as well as (marginally) strengthening weak unions may reduce the
unemployment rate, if the unemployment compensation scheme is given by
(12). This concludes the proof of proposition 4. ¥
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Figure 1: The impact of constant real benefits on the equilibrium relation 
of wages and the unemployment rate. 
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Figure 2: The impact of social assistance payments on the equilibrium relation 
of wages and the unemployment rate if ( )wb  is given by (9). 
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Figure 3: The impact of social assistance payments on the equilibrium relation 
of wages and the unemployment rate if ( )wb  is given by (12). 
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Figure 4: The impact of the bargaining power of unions g , 
if ( ) 10 >× uxa
b
 and ( ) ( ) 1~1ˆ0 >×-×× bu cxa
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Figure 5: The impact of the bargaining power of unions g , 
if ( ) 10 >× uxa
b
 and ( ) ( ) 1~1ˆ0 <×-×× bu cxa
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